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It looks already like old news in these incredibly fast-moving times. But please
let’s take a moment and reflect on this: At the general elections in Poland last
weekend, nearly one out of two has voted for the governing PiS coalition. They did
so regardless of the damage PiS had done to the rule of law and quite unabashedly
promised to continue doing if reelected. They put the new PiS government in a
position to say: Look, we didn’t hide our intention to crack down on what’s left of the
independent judiciary and media, did we? And here we are, reaffirmed with a solid
governing majority in the Sejm by the people. Now watch us keep our promises.
It is a hallmark of authoritarian populism that it pits democracy against the rule
of law, claiming prevalence of the first over the latter. Authoritarian populists use
the power bestowed upon them by the democratic will of the people to change
the legal rules by which that will is formed in the first place. They strive to tune
the constitutional apparatus by which the democratic will is produced in a way
that makes it more likely or even inevitable that the outcome will corroborate
their own populist claims about what the true will of the people is. This tuning
encompasses the entire process of politics, the whole chain of deliberating, making,
implementing and scrutinizing collectively binding decisions: the media, electoral
law, parliamentary proceedings, civil service, independent courts – every element of
democratic decision making under the rule of law becomes a target of authoritarian
populist encroachment, with the aim of turning the democratic process into a closed
feedback loop where being in power and belonging in power are by and large the
same thing.
Budapest on the Vistula?
In Poland, this feedback loop is, so far, still incomplete. Nevertheless, the endeavour
to close it has already had an impact: According to the OSCE, turning state
television into a tool of rank government propaganda did in fact compromise voters’
ability to make an informed choice how to cast their ballots. And if the PiS goes
through with their plans to „repolonize“ foreign-held private media, things might
deteriorate very quickly. Add to that the things the PiS majority now can and very
well might do to electoral law and oversight, to campaign financing, to the whole
range of legal fine-tuning of the democratic process, and you get a picture of what to
expect.
But the largest contribution to the closing of the loop comes arguably from the EU
itself. The PiS party owes its popularity and thereby its electoral victory principally
to the lavish social policy it has pursued over the last four years in government.
Whatever sympathies you have for that sort of reallocation of wealth, it is principally
EU money which allows the Polish government to afford this kind of spending. In the
current 2014-2020 period, Poland has been allocated 86 billion Euros from European
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Structural and Investment Funds. There have been proposals to change this and
introduce new or use existing means to cut funding for deviant member states, but
the Council so far seems to be disinclined to let that happen.
Personally, as a European tax payer, I deeply resent the fact that my tax money is
used to subsidize and actually facilitate authoritarian populism. And I truly believe
that this could do severe damage to the trust and support of those who have
defended the EU against its critics most passionately. In Hungary, the largest
recipient of EU funds per capita, EU subsidies have allowed the government to
maintain a network of clientelism and personal enrichment for cronies of the Prime
Minister, much like oil revenues in any old Petro state. If the EU lets this stand, then
to its own peril.
++++++++A Note from Wojciech Sadurski+++++++
- 2 -
++++++++++Advertisement++++++++++++
Most EU activities towards Poland in recent months were about judicial
independence, and rightly so: Judicial independence is a centrepiece of the rule of
law, no question about that. But there is also a larger issue at stake: the replacement
of a far from blameless but altogether functional constitutional system of collectively
binding decision-making with a populist closed loop where the output determines the
input and vice versa. 
Political forces who push for that sort of closed loop exist in pretty much every
European country. And with the current decay of the old post-war party system of
Socialists v. Christian Democrats throughout Europe, not one of them, Germany
included, can be sure that these authoritarian populist forces won’t at some point get
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into a position of wielding some serious political power. Therefore, every EU country
as well as the EU itself has ample reason to take a critical look at the resilience of
their constitutional system in that case.
Take, once again, Hungary. For the the rise of Fidesz authoritarian populism,
all sorts of explanations abound, cultural, historical and otherwise. But first of
all, the rise of authoritarian populism in Hungary was facilitated by the fact that
the Hungarian constitutional system was exceptionally vulnerable: a grossly
disproportionate electoral system transformed a 50% majority of votes into a
two-thirds majority of Parliament seats in a unicameral system! I still find it mind-
blowing in retrospect to see a constitutional system handing to the winner of one
simple election such unfettered power without any effective checks and balance
whatsoever. Ten years after, in the case of Hungary, that power has been put to
use, and the feedback loop of power successfully closed. And the EU institutions, to
their everlasting shame, have mostly been sitting on their hands while it happened.
When I look at the sorry spectacle of the EPP’s „membership suspension“ for Fidesz,
I gain the impression that many still prefer to sit on their hands to this very day, for
whichever reasons.
Not quite yet
Compared to the Hungarian constitutional system, the Polish has proven to be much
more resilient, surprising as that may sound. First of all, and most importantly, it
didn’t give the authoritarian populists the right to change the letter of the constitution
on the basis of a single won election. In order to get around their constitutional
constraints, PiS had to break them in the most blunt and brutal way. Fidesz didn’t
even have to get their hands dirty. 
The institutional setup of Poland is more robust, too: Poland does have a second
chamber of Parliament, the Senate, as we notice now that the opposition indeed
was able to break the PiS majority in that chamber. This might be instrumental, as
MARCIN MATCZAK notes, particularly when it comes to the nominations of key
office holders, most of all the successor of the heroic Ombudsman Adam Bodnar
next year. As far as legislation is concerned, the Senate cannot avert much but it
can slow things down. That is also a lot more than nothing. It keeps open a space of
political deliberation which will be in dire need in the coming years, particular with the
PiS majority constantly driving coach and horses through the parliamentary standing
orders in the Sejm. Then, there is the President. He has a basis of democratic
legitimacy independent of the government’s. With the current incumbent, this worked
in favour of PiS most of the time, but it might turn into a serious headache for them if
the opposition – like in Romania – manages to place one of their own in that office at
the presidential election next year.
And even the Hungarian case, it seems, may not be as bleak as one would have
thought after all. The fact that the opposition has managed to win the municipal
elections in Budapest and a number of other cities is no small feat at all. Not just that
it offers the opportunity to break up the mind-numbing uniformity of the Hungarian
public sphere, with a young mayor with own administrative and political competences
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and a budget to do things and a space to discuss things in a way Fidesz cannot
control governing over the nation’s capital. It also proves that a strategy for the
opposition to combine their forces and to overcome their differences in the interest of
defeating authoritarian populism can indeed be successful. In a place like Hungary, it
makes little sense to fight about policy as long as authoritarian populists remain in a
position in which they can make fighting for divergent policy interests totally pointless
in the first place. To remove them from that position must be the first priority for all,
and to see a place where this is possible, Viktor Orbán now just has to look out of
the window. 
He won’t like that, for sure. And he will wreck his mind to find ways to re-close the
loop. Let’s hope his imagination fails him.
The right to protest
It’s hard to believe, I know, but we didn’t have a single Brexit-related post on the blog
this week. This is not going to last, I am sure.
The big news of this week was the Spanish Supreme Court’s decision in the Catalan
secessionist case. The exceptionally harsh judgment is vehemently criticized by
JOSÉ LUIS MARTÍ who points to the vital importance of the right to protest for
democracy, in stark contrast to the dismissive words the Supreme Court found for
that right.
The Hungarian municipal elections and their effect on Orbán’s rule are analyzed by
VIKTOR KAZAI and JÁNOS MÉCS.
+++++++++A Note from MPIL+++++++++++
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What Legal Framework for the OSCE? A Book Launch Conversation
The OSCE lacks a constitutive treaty and an established international legal
personality. An increasing number of voices have been advocating for more formal
and autonomous institutional structures, for international legal personality, or even
for the adoption of a constitutive treaty. A new book edited by Mateja Steinbrück
Platise, Carolyn Moser and Anne Peters critically analyses the reform proposals and




In Poland, memory politics is taking over the law, and anyone who writes something
critical about Poland during World War II might be taken to court, a development
examined by ALEKSANDRA GLISZCZY#SKA-GRABIAS and MICHA# JAB#O#SKI. 
TOMASZ KONCEWICZ, on the occasion of the general elections, takes a step back
to look the new constitutional doctrine that has emerged in Poland since 2015 and
its effect on the European Union.
MARCIN MATCZAK, as already mentioned, provides an analysis about the
unexpected change brought forth by the Polish elections, particularly with respect to
the now opposition-dominated Senate which could in fact change many things to the
better with respect to the rule of law and democracy.
In the EU, both the Polish PiS and the Hungarian Fidesz are members of European
parties which can be and in fact was attacked as a violation of these parties’
obligations under EU law. GIORGO GRASSO takes a look at the way the European
Ombudsman handled this matter.
Slovakian politics is embroiled in a corruption scandal of unseen proportions which
also includes parts of the judiciary, as MICHAL OVÁDEK observes.
In Italy, there is another attempt underway to reform Parliament, this time however,
as EDOARDO D’ALFONSO MASARIÉ notes, being only about reducing the size of
the assembly, not amending its powers and competences.
In the USA, the Supreme Court has accepted a case which could initiate a break
with the Court’s jurisprudence about abortion. SARAH KATHARINA STEIN
examines what Trump’s new conservative majority on the bench could bring about.
Trump is in facing impeachment for his dealings with the Ukraine president, but the
latter doesn’t look that good either in the transcript of the phone call between both.
ALINA CHERVIATSOVA reports on the reverberations of the scandal in the Ukraine.
In Bulgaria, the legislator has revived the totalitarian practice of secret arrests,
under the pretext of implementing an EU directive on the right of access to a lawyer
in criminal proceedings. RADOSVETA VASSILEVA is alarmed about the lack of
action by the EU.
In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court has issued a verdict about the right of
hotel owners to „discriminate“ against far-right politicians by refusing their services to
them. FABIAN MICHL regrets the lack of clarity caused by the FCC jurisdiction.
Elsewhere
RONAN Ó FATAIGH and DIRK VORHOOF are irritated about the length the ECtHR
is prepared to go to avoid condemning Turkey for violation of the freedom of
expression of a newspaper editor who had been prosecuted for quoting PKK leader
Öcalan.
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OLIVER GARNER thinks that the European Council would be legally entitled
to impose conditions on the extension of the Brexit deadline on the UK, but
nevertheless warns against doing so.
HANNAH WOOLAVER argues that a failure to comply with domestic constitutional
law might prevent the UK’s withdrawal from the EU from taking effect in international
law.
That’s all for this week. My special gratitude goes to those wonderful people who
support us with a little something each month on Steady – Verfassungsblog wouldn’t
exist but for you! All best, and take care,
Max Steinbeis
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